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I. INTRODUCTION

How can a judge undermine precedent while still following it?
This Essay considers the methods by which Supreme Court
Justices may weaken precedent without explicitly overruling cases
by strategically adopting an approach to stare decisis that is less
Adding to the
explicitly aggressive than their colleagues'.
literature of "stealth overruling," this Essay considers examples of
such methods from Chief Justice Roberts's first five years on the
Supreme Court. These examples indicate that Chief Justice
Roberts knows how to engage in stealth overruling and, more
broadly, how to use his colleagues' preferences to maintain a
formal commitment to judicial humility while achieving
jurisprudential change. As such, they reveal important insights
about how Justices can operate strategically to achieve their
preferences within both the opportunities and the confines
inherent in a multi-judge court.
After five years, many have accused the Roberts Court of
aggressively attacking precedent. No less a figure than Justice
O'Connor, whose retirement marked the effective start of that
Court, has expressed concern about the Roberts Court's willingness
Then-Judge Roberts's famous
to overrule prior decisions.'
of
judging to umpiring2 and his
analogy
confirmation hearing
professed respect for stare decisis3 make for a dramatic narrative in
which a nominee piously describes a humble role for judges but
then, once safely confirmed, sets out with a wrecking ball.
The charge may have merit, but a short essay is not the vehicle
to make that determination. Simply pointing to a few high-profile
I See Joan Biskupic, Sandra Day O'Connor Says Rulings Are Being 'Dismantled,' USA
TODAY, Oct. 5, 2009, at Al (noting that O'Connor "regrets that some of her decisions 'are
being dismantled' by the current Supreme Court"); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts is
Most Conservative in Decades,N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at Al (quoting O'Connor).
2 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
[hereinafter Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court).
3 Id. at 158 (expressing the preference to be "known as a modest judge," which involved
"respect for precedent that forms part of the rule of law that the judge is obligated to apply
under principles of stare decisis").
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overrulings, as critics sometimes do, proves little.4 Rather, an indepth examination of the issue requires considering the situations
where the overruling dog did not bark-that is, where the Court
could have overruled a prior case but declined to do so. 5 Such an
investigation also calls for both historical perspective and nuance. 6
Reaching interesting conclusions about the Roberts Court's
treatment of stare decisis requires that we identify a baseline of
how previous Courts have treated that principle. If impressionistic
conclusions based on a few dramatic examples are enough to
consider the charge proven, then the Rehnquist 7 and Warren 8
Courts are presumably guilty also.
Moreover, not all overrulings are created equal. Determining
the extent of the Roberts Court's alleged disregard of precedent
also requires considering the importance of the precedents the
Court has in fact rejected. Consider Justice White's dissent in INS
v. Chadha.9 White characterized the majority's rejection of the
legislative veto as effectively striking down hundreds of statutes
and eliminating a then-major feature of the modern
administrative state.'0 Chadha was not a case where the Court
overruled precedent. Justice White's complaint about the farreaching nature of the Court's decision, however, reminds us that
identifying judicial aggressiveness, whatever its form, requires
See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Everything You Read About the Supreme Court is Wrong
(Updated), ScoTUsBLOG (June 30, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/everyt
hing-you-read-about-the-supreme-court-is-wrong/#more-22491 (noting that "generalizations
are often misleading or outright wrong').
5 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006) (declining to overrule Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
6 See Orin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFF. 31, 34 (March/April 2003) (arguing
that evaluating the Warren and Rehnquist Courts' activism by comparing the number of
federal laws they struck down is misleading given the Warren Court's focus on ensuring
that state governments complied with constitutional requirements).
7 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); see also Ernest A. Young, Judicial
Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 CoLO. L. REV. 1139, 1168 (2002) (noting criticism of
the Rehnquist Court's "disregard of stare decisis").
8 See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1112 n.215 (2002) (noting that the Warren Court overturned "scores
of ... precedents" in the criminal procedure field).
9 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983).
10 Id.
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more than simply adding up the number of cases where the Court
has acted aggressively."
This Essay considers the Roberts Court and stare decisis from a
different angle. It examines several methods by which Chief
Justice Roberts arguably has used the multi-judge nature of the
Supreme Court to his advantage in undermining precedent
without explicitly calling for its overruling.12 These examples do
not prove that the Court as a whole, or the Chief Justice in
particular, is bent on undoing the work of prior Courts. Instead,
they illustrate the ways in which a Justice can work within the
formal confines of precedent to achieve fundamentally different
results, either in the short or long term.' 3
The methods described below depend in part on the distinction
between the result a court reaches in a case and the reasoning it
employs. The nature of the Supreme Court as a multi-judge court
makes this distinction possible: often times, the Court may agree
on a result but split sharply on its reasoning. 4 This opens up
room for a creative Justice to undermine precedent, even as the
Justice expresses reasons that appear moderate-in particular,
more moderate than those who are more inclined to overrule
explicitly. In so doing, the Justice may create the conditions for
the ultimate rejection of that precedent, even while publicly
counseling restraint-indeed, even while voting to uphold that

11See Kerr, supra note 6, at 32 (describing varied manifestations of judicial activism).
For example, Professor Barry Friedman's examination of the Court's treatment of Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), makes clear that a relatively small set of Supreme Court
opinions construing one precedent can impact government behavior that occurs thousands
of times every day. See generally Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with
ParticularAttention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010).
12 For another look at this same issue, see Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings,
Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law,
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with author), availableat http://
(discussing the various tools
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1750398
Supreme Court Justices use to "move the law").
1s See also id. (describing four ways in which the Court engages in "stealth overruling"anticipatory overruling, invitations, time bombs, and inadvertence).
14 See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (considering some of the implications of this fact for the consistency of a
multi-judge court's results and the coherence of its analysis).
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precedent.' 5 In short, this Essay considers methods by which
Justices can play well with others-both those that came before
(via respect for stare decisis) and current colleagues (by
strategically positioning themselves among them)-and still
achieve their ultimate goal. 16
This Essay situates itself at the intersection of two ongoing
debates about judicial behavior. The first examines the concept of
stealth overruling-the practice of limiting or even eviscerating a
precedent while ostensibly remaining faithful to it.'7 This
phenomenon has become a major topic of scholarly discussion
during the last five years, 8 as scholars have identified and
analyzed examples of the Roberts Court engaging in such
conduct-conduct generally thought to have resulted from the
replacement of a sometimes centrist Justice O'Connor with a more
reliably conservative Justice Alito.' 9 The examples in this Essay
illustrate instances where the Court or a plurality thereof
arguably has engaged in such conduct. 20 The lessons one can draw
from these examples will help shape an understanding of the
stealth overruling phenomenon, and the extent to which the
Roberts Court performs it.
Second, this Essay engages the debate about the implications of
the Supreme Court's character as a collegial body. Scholars long
have acknowledged that critiques of the Court must account for its
collegial nature rather than simply treating it as a purposive
15 See Friedman, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that stealth overruling allows Justices to
overrule precedent without "arousing negative public opinion").
16 Thus, this Essay can be understood as considering the mirror image of the question of
how the collegial nature of appellate courts influences the consistency and analytical
coherence of the Court's output. For a discussion of this question, see Kornhauser & Sager,
supra note 14, at 102-15.
17 Friedman, supra note 11, at 3 n.2.
1s See, e.g., id. (discussing stealth overruling in the context of Miranda v. Arizona);
Hasen, supra note 12, at 2-3 (describing four tools Justices use to move the law).
19 Friedman, supra note 11, at 30.
20 See infra Parts III-V. These are not the only examples. Among the most prominent of
the others is Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007), where the Court upheld a
federal abortion restriction that was largely indistinguishable from a state-law restriction
struck down seven years earlier while not expressly overruling that earlier precedent. See
id. at 170, 187-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of ruling inconsistently
with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)).
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individual. 2 1 This Essay contributes to that debate by considering
how Chief Justice Roberts may in certain cases strategically use his
colleagues' calls for more explicit overruling of precedent as a tool in
maintaining his and the Court's reputation as faithful to stare
decisis while nevertheless pushing the law away from precedents.
In essence, this Essay considers how the practice of stealth
overruling may be influenced by the Court's multi-judge nature. It
therefore contributes to the ongoing debates about both the
general implications of the Court's collegial character and the
practice of stealth overruling.
Nothing in this Essay is intended to suggest that Chief Justice
Roberts is in fact pursuing a strategy of stealth overruling or
manipulating his position on a multi-member court. A judge's
subjective motives are exceptionally difficult to discern, and to
make confident assessments of what a Justice or a Court is doing
requires far deeper investigation than this short space will permit.
Instead, the examples below merely illustrate the strategies a
judge in Chief Justice Roberts's position can employ. 22 Still, the
extent to which one finds the Chief Justice engaging in the
strategies sketched below might serve as circumstantial evidence
of his ultimate motives. More generally, identifying the methods
illustrated below may assist in the larger project of assessing
whether the Roberts Court is guilty as charged of engaging in
these tactics. Finally, as stated earlier, this investigation helps
illuminate how the multi-judge nature of the Court opens up such
possibilities for "playing well" while still winning.

21 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 804
(1982) ("[The Justices believe that a show of agreement is beneficial to the institution ... and
collegial work and compromise are essential to the ability of the Justices to agree.');
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 16, at 99 n.24 (recognizing the collegiality of the Court as a
significant factor in granting or denying certiorari, and in deliberations concerning an
accepted case); see also Friedman, supra note 11, at 32-33 (considering whether the value of
collegial decision making justifies the Court's practice of stealth overruling).
22 This Essay does not address whether Chief Justice Roberts's formal position as leader of
the Court provides him with additional means of accomplishing this goal. Further study likely
should continue on this subject. See infra Part VII (suggesting further areas for study).
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II. WINNING BY LOSING
One way to subtly push law away from current precedent is to

concede the likely error of that precedent but conclude that
prudential factors counsel against overruling-at least right away.
Chief Justice Roberts used this method in Rothgery v. Gillespie
County,23 a case that considered the question of when in the
criminal justice process the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches. 24 Justice Souter, writing for eight Justices, concluded
that the right attaches when defendants first appear before a
judicial officer, they learn of the charge against them, and their
liberty is subject to restriction. 25 He based this conclusion on
analysis of Supreme Court precedent as well as the practice of the
vast majority of states to provide criminal defense counsel at
approximately that point in the process. 26
Justice Thomas dissented. 27 He concluded that the original
understanding of the term "criminal prosecutions" as used in the
Sixth Amendment referred to the "filing [of] formal charges in a
court with jurisdiction to try and punish the defendant."28 He
dismissed the Supreme Court precedents relied on by the majority
as not fully reasoned and providing only dicta on the precise issue
before the Court. 29
So far this description presents a fairly standard story of a
modern Supreme Court constitutional case: one opinion relies on
precedent while another discounts the significance of the
precedent and uses originalist analysis to reach a different
conclusion. What is interesting for this Essay is Chief Justice
Roberts's separate concurrence, particularly the first paragraph of
his brief, two-paragraph opinion: "Justice Thomas's analysis of the
present issue is compelling, but I believe the result here is
554 U.S. 191 (2008).
Id. at 194-95; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
25 See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 218.
28 Id. at 223.
29 Id. at 228-36.
23

24
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controlled by [the cases relied on by Justice Souter]. A sufficient
case has not been made for revisiting those precedents, and
accordingly I join the Court's opinion."30
In one sense, the Chief Justice's approach is a paragon of
modesty: even if a precedent is wrong-as he suggested 31-the
wiser course is not to revisit it unless "a sufficient case" has been
made for doing so. 32 Still, one can be forgiven for being suspicious.
Rather than simply finding an insufficient case to overrule, Chief
Justice Roberts all but stated that the dissent was correct but that
other, presumably prudential, reasons counseled against applying
that "compelling"33 understanding of the law. With one stroke, the
Chief Justice both reaffirmed and undermined precedent. 34
Will this approach have a material effect on the Rothgery rule?
Predictions, of course, are hazardous. But it seems plausible that
the Chief Justice's concurrence, by announcing that Rothgery was
correct only by dint of stare decisis rather than its intrinsic merit,
will place more pressure on the rule. Surely it suggests a view
30 Id. at 213.
31 The Chief Justice's concurrence can be read more charitably: On the merits he did not
believe the precedents supporting the Rothgery majority opinion to be wrong. This seems
unlikely, however, unless those precedents and Justice Thomas's "compelling" analysis of
"the present issue" are somehow both right in the Chief Justice's mind. Id. Thanks to
Nelson Tebbe for suggesting this possibility.
32

Id.

33 Id. at 213.
34 One might compare this approach to that taken by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in their joint opinion in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey.
505 U.S. 833 (1992). In that case, in the course of reaffirming what those Justices called
"the essential holding" of Roe v. Wade, id. at 846, the authors hedged on their views as to
Roe's correctness. Id. at 853 ("While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on
behalf of the State in the case before us, arguments which in their ultimate formulation
conclude that Roe should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming
the central holding of Roe are outweighed by... the force of stare decisis[, among other
factors]."). Of course, two of the three authors already had expressed their discomfort-to
put it mildly-with Roe. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., joining in the judgment) (modifying and narrowing Roe's reach); City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(warning that the "Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with itself'). But that
is exactly the point. Rather than openly disagree with a precedent they were reaffirming
for reasons of stare decisis, they instead demurred, even though two of the authors' views
on the underlying precedent were already more than an open secret. By contrast, Chief
Justice Roberts's concurrence in Rothgery nearly explicitly embraced the dissent.
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that Rothgery and its precedent cases should not be expanded. If
such a view attracts additional adherents, the accumulation of
precedents refusing to extend Rothgery to new circumstances
inevitably will raise the question whether those new cases
effectively have overruled the old ones or, at the very least, have
eroded them to the point of rendering stare decisis a less weighty
consideration when deciding whether to overrule them.
This would be a long-term process. But when Justice Thomas's
analysis could not attract five votes, such incremental
undermining may have been the most efficient use of the Chief
Justice's prestige, especially given his desire to avoid being seen as
aggressively calling for the overruling of precedent. 35 Indeed, as
suggested above, the combination of his overt attack on the
correctness of the majority's reasoning and his adoption of it only
as a matter of stare decisis presumably increases his credibility as
a modest jurist. 36 At the same time, his strategy invites future
litigants to suggest cabining the Rothgery precedent, thereby
If this dynamic
isolating and ultimately undermining it.
is not extended,
Rothgery
where
situation
a
to
leads
eventually
and thus evolves into an aberration, then the way would be clear
for the Chief Justice to justify overruling in pursuit of the larger
doctrinal coherence he openly has elevated, at least in some cases,
over stare decisis.37
See Confirmation Hearing,supra note 3, at 158.
Another example of Chief Justice Roberts claiming credibility as a modest jurist can be
seen in his concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010), which was
devoted to the stare decisis issues implicated in the Court's decision to overrule Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and part of McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93 (2003). In his defense of the Court's decision, Chief Justice Roberts cited the
Court's decision, the previous term, to refrain from striking down the Voting Rights Act in
favor of adopting a more limited reading of the statute that provided relief to the plaintiff.
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009)). One can read the
Chief Justice's Citizens United concurrence as arguing that the Court's approach in
NAMUDNO demonstrates that the current Court does not instinctively adopt the most
extreme approach to deciding cases.
37 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917, 920-21 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("We must
balance the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of
having them decided right."); id. at 921 ("Abrogating the errant precedent, rather than
reaffirming or extending it, might better preserve the law's coherence and curtail the
3

36
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III. WINNING ONE CASE AT ATIME
As exemplified in Rothgery, one approach for a Justice inclined to
undermine precedent without doing so explicitly is to concede the
correctness of the revisionist view while counseling prudence.
Another way, at least in some cases, is to respect precedent
governing the facial constitutionality of a statute but to interpret it
so that it does little practical work. Chief Justice Roberts adopted
such an approach in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL I1).38
WRTL H considered an as-applied challenge to section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. Section 203
restricts corporations' and unions' use of their general treasury
funds to pay for political advertisements immediately before
elections if those ads could be understood as appeals to vote for or
against a particular electoral candidate.39 In the 2003 case of
McConnell v. FEC,40 the Court upheld the facial validity of section
203 against a First Amendment challenge. 41 After McConnell, and
prior to WRTL II, however, the Court held that would-be speakers
could mount as-applied challenges to section 203.42
WRTL II considered such an as-applied challenge and sustained
it on a 5-to-4 vote. 43 The four dissenters were the still-active
Justices who had voted in McConnell to uphold the facial validity
of section 203.44 Of the five Justices in the majority, three-Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas-had dissented from McConnell's facial
upholding of section 203.45 In WRTL II these three Justices would
have overruled that part of McConnell and struck down section

precedent's disruptive effects"). See also infra Part V (discussing Chief Justice Roberts's
possible preference for high-level doctrinal coherence).
38 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
39 Id. at 455-57.
40 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
41 Id. at 209.
42 Wis. Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL 1), 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006).
4 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 454-57.
44 Id. at 483; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110-11.
The fifth member of the McConnell
majority was Justice O'Connor, who had retired by the time WRTL II was decided.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 110-11.
6

Id.
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203 as unconstitutional on its face. 46 This lineup left the two
Justices who joined the Court after McConnell-Roberts and
Alito-in the middle. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the lead opinion,
in the relevant parts of which only Justice Alito joined. 47 That
opinion interpreted the ad in question as not analogous to the type
of ad that McConnell held could constitutionally be regulated.48 In
other words, Chief Justice Roberts construed McConnell's
application of section 203 to cover a relatively narrow set of ads.
Thus, he was able to rule for the speaker without having to
reconsider McConnell.49
The Chief Justice's analysis is hard to credit. Both Justice
Souter, writing for the dissenters, and Justice Scalia, writing for
the Justices concurring in the judgment, rightly criticized his
reading of McConnell.50 But his analysis paid dividends. First, his
seemingly moderate, cautious approach arguably preserved
nothing but the shell of McConnell by interpreting its favorable
verdict on section 203 such that it regulated very few ads. Indeed,
in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC, the case that delivered the
formal coup de grace to restrictions on corporate political speech,
some scholars observed that the real overruling of McConnell
occurred in WRTL 11.51
Second, to the extent that his explanation of what ads come
within section 203's restrictions was itself so vague as to chill
46 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483, 499-500 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
47 Id. at 454.
48 Id. at 464-70.
49 This approach required the Chief Justice to consider whether the ads in question could
be regulated as a consequence of an application of section 203 broader than McConnell's.
Applying strict scrutiny because this was political speech, he concluded that the
Constitution did not permit that regulation. Id.
50 Id. at 498 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
525-27 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11, at 11 ("[Ift was almost impossible to maintain that
the holding of McConnell had any force after WRTL."); id. at 31 ("WRTL gutted McConnell,
leaving nothing but the burial."); see also WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 504 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that WRTL II "effectively" overruled McConnell); Richard Hasen, What the Court
Did-And Why, AM. INT. (July/August 2010), available at http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article-bd.c fm?piece=853 (suggesting that "[iut is easy to both overstate and
understate the importance of Citizens United' in light of WRTL II).
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protected speech, 52 the Chief Justice's analysis arguably included a
built-in self-destruct button that eventually could have brought
down section 203 as part of the collateral damage. Justice Scalia
argued that the Chief Justice's interpretation of Section 203 would
impermissibly chill speech.53 Justice Alito recognized this in his
own concurring opinion, in which he all but invited a facial
challenge to section 203 as newly interpreted. 54 In embracing an
interpretation that experience may have proved to be
unworkable,55 thus requiring reconsideration of section 203's facial
validity, Chief Justice Roberts arguably started the timer on that
self-destruct button. 56 As with Rothgery, the picture presented to
the world was of a careful, prudent treatment of precedent in
contrast to other Justices' more explicit call for overruling. But
again as with Rothgery, the Chief Justice's approach all but
invited attack on that precedent.
Of course, we know now how the story turned out. In Citizens
United the Court declined to rely on narrower grounds to vindicate
what even the dissent called the group's "substantial" First
Amendment challenge.57 Rather, it simply overruled McConnell
and the precedent on which it relied.58 In essence, if the Chief
Justice did intend to insert a time bomb in WRTL II, the bomb

52 Justice Scalia made this argument.
WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483, 492-93 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
53 Id.
This type of opinion can be understood as a
5 Id. at 482-83 (Alito, J., concurring).
species of the "invitations to overrule" Professor Rick Hasen identifies as one of the ways
Justices can move the law without doing so explicitly. Hasen, supra note 12, at 6.
ss The locution "may have proved" is required because, as events developed, the Court
moved forthrightly to confront McConnell. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
56 The metaphor of a "self-destruct button" or "time bomb" as used here is distinct from
Hasen's. Hasen, supra note 12, at 10-12 (explaining his concept of "time bombs" as
seemingly innocuous language in an opinion that later can be used to move the law in the
author's desired direction). For another take on the same basic idea-that WRTL II created
a system that was likely to fail constitutional requirements, thus setting the stage for
striking down the entire system-see Friedman, supranote 11, at 31-32 (explaining how in
Citizens United the Court noted the complexity of the FEC's regulations as a factor in
striking down the underlying statute even though the FEC's rules arose in response to the
Court's WRTL IIanalysis).
5 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929, 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

58 Id. at 913.
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never had a chance to explode.59 The speech in Citizens United
was so clearly an exhortation to vote against Hillary Clinton that
any perceived vagueness or chill inherent in the Chief Justice's
WRTL II formula was simply irrelevant to the analysis.60 Rather,
the speech in Citizens United so clearly advocated a candidate's
defeat that the question was squarely posed whether such speech
could be constitutionally restricted. 61 The stark facts of Citizens
United rendered moot any claim that the Chief Justice's vague
interpretation of section 203 in WRTL II unconstitutionally chilled
protected speech.
Still, what remains relevant for purposes of this Essay is that
the Chief Justice's statutory interpretation strategy in WRTL II
arguably undermined McConnell without overruling it explicitly.
Moreover, by offering an interpretation of section 203 that was
susceptible to claims that the interpretation was too vague to
constitutionally restrict speech, he may have written a roadmap
for explicitly overruling McConnell in a future case. Of course, as
noted above, while the Court in Citizens United soon thereafter
overruled McConnell, it did not do so as the culmination of this
supposed strategy. Still, speculation about the Chiefs strategy in
WRTL II reveals another way in which a Justice can undermine
precedent without overruling it directly, particularly when a
colleague has called for such a direct overruling.
IV. WINNING BY REDEFINING THE PRECEDENT

A competent judge cannot simply deny the existence of
undesirable precedent, but he can recast it so that, newly
understood, it does not stand in the way of the judge's preferred
outcome. Chief Justice Roberts arguably managed this feat at two
points in the September 2009 reargument in Citizens United. First,
consider his colloquy with then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan
59 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
61 Of course, it must be noted that the Citizens United Court had available to it several
avenues to rule for the would-be speaker on narrower grounds. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 888-96 (rejecting these narrower grounds); see also id. at 936-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should have resolved the case on those narrower grounds).
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about the reasoning in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,62
a key precedent the FEC relied on in the Citizens United
litigation:63
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, what do you - what do you understand to be the compelling interest
that the Court articulated in Austin?
GENERAL KAGAN: I think that what the Court
articulated

in Austin -- and,

of course,

in the

government briefs we have suggested that Austin did
not articulate what we believe to be the strongest
compelling interest, which is the anticorruption
interest. But what the Court articulated in Austin was
essentially a concern about corporations using the
corporate form to appropriate other people's money for
expressive purposes.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. So but you -you have more or less -- "abandoned" is too strong a

word, but as you say you have relied on a different
interest, the quid pro quo corruption. And you -- you
articulate on page 11 of your brief -- you recognize that

this Court has not accepted that interest as a
compelling interest.
So isn't it the case that as you view Austin it is kind
of up for play in the sense that you would ground it on
an interest that the Court has never recognized?64
As election law expert Professor Rick Hasen observed regarding
this exchange, "[o]ne could almost hear the gears turning in the
Chief Justice's head, as he got the government basically to admit it
was abandoning the Austin distortion argument and relying on

494 U.S. 652 (1990).
* 130 S. Ct. at 903 (addressing the FEC's contention that two compelling interests
support Austin's affirmation of corporate speech restrictions).
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(No. 08-205) [hereinafter Oral Argument] (emphasis added).
62
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two new arguments which had never been accepted by the Court
in the context of independent corporate spending. . . ."6 5
At another point in the oral argument Chief Justice Roberts
was even more abrupt. Much of the discussion of precedent had
centered on whether the Court in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti66 had stated that elections were sufficiently different from
referendums with regard to their potential for corruption that
Congress could regulate corporate contributions to influence the
former, even if it could not restrict contributions to referendum
campaigns. 67 Consider the following discussion on this point
between Justice Stevens, defending this reading of Bellotti,
Theodore B. Olson, counsel for Citizens United, 68 Justice Scalia,
and the Chief Justice:
JUSTICE STEVENS: [Bellotti] more than said we
are not deciding [the acceptability of limits on
corporate contributions to electoral campaigns]. It
said [referendum campaigns and electoral campaigns]
are entirely different situations. You read that long
footnote which has been cited six or eight times by our
later cases.
MR. OLSON: Yes. And I also read the footnote 14 in
the Bellotti case that cited case after case after case that
said corporations had rights, protected rights under the
First Amendment. I am not disagreeing with what you
just said, Justice Stevens. The Court said it was -- it
was dicta, because the Court did not deal with -JUSTICE STEVENS: But it has been repeated -that footnote has been repeatedly cited in subsequent
cases, most of which were unanimous.

65 Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on the Re-Argument in Citizens United, ELECTION LAW
BLOG (Sept. 9, 2009, 10:51 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/014401.html (emphasis
added).
6 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
67 See, e.g., Oral Argument, supra note 64, at 16-18 (discussing significance of Bellotti
holding).
68 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
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MR. OLSON: Well, because it was -- and I agree the

Bellotti Court was not discussing that.

But [t]he

Bellotti Court --

JUSTICE STEVENS: It did discuss it precisely in
that footnote and it said it's a different case.
MR. OLSON: I understand and I don't disagree with
what you have just said, Justice Stevens.
JUSTICE SCALIA: It didn't say it would come out
differently. It just said, we're not deciding that case,
right?
MR. OLSON: That -- that is -- that's the point I'm

trying to make.
JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't mind citing that. Bellotti
didn't decide that.
MR. OLSON: What Bellotti also said is -- and I think
this is also in many decisions of this Court -- the

inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of the source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Now that we've
cleared up that Bellotti didn't decide the question,
what is the distinction that -- why don't you think that

distinction makes sense?69
With Justice Scalia's assistance, Chief Justice Roberts effectively
shut down the discussion about whether Bellotti had decided
Congress's authority to regulate corporate spending on electoral
campaigns. Having dispensed with the possibility of precedent
constraining his choice, the Chief Justice was ready, as the last few
words of the excerpt indicate, to argue against such restrictions.
Though one should not make too much of oral arguments, one
can sometimes discern Justices' thought processes as they work
through a series of questions with an advocate. 70 Here, one gets the
Oral Argument, supranote 64, at 16-18 (emphasis added).
See Hasen, supra note 65 (basing conclusions of how each Justice would vote on the
oral argument questions).
69

70
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sense that the Chief Justice was working his way through
unfavorable precedent by either cornering the advocate into a
position where the precedent does not stand in his way7 1 or simply
by decreeing the dispute about precedent to be settled in his favor. 72
In Citizens United, the Chief Justice's plantings bore fruit in
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court. Justice Kennedy relied
on the first of these exchanges to undermine Austin.73 In addition,
the opinion tracked the view of Bellotti's key footnote in the way
proposed by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts in the second
of these exchanges. 74 Thus, one can see the oral argument
questioning as potentially aimed at pointing the way for a
colleague's later analysis expressly discrediting undesirable
precedent.75

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES' VOTES AND THE
LIMITS OF INDIRECTION: THE FATE OF FLAST V. COHEN

Rothgery and WRTL II suggest how a Justice inclined to
surreptitiously undermine precedent can do so by exploiting the
distinction between results and rationales. 76 Ultimately, however,
the success of any such strategy requires support-or at least
acquiescence-from four other Justices. This basic fact is reflected
in two recent cases considering how broadly to read the Court's
limited allowance of taxpayer standing in Flast v. Cohen:77 Hein v.
78 and Arizona Christian
Freedom From Religion Foundation
79
School Tuition Organizationv. Winn.
71 Oral Argument, supra note 64, at 45-46 (discussing Austin with then-Solicitor General
Kagan).
12 Id. at 16-18 (foreclosing the discussion of Bellotti).
7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (citing oral argument transcript).
7 Id. at 909 ("A single footnote in Bellotti purported to leave open the possibility that
corporate independent expenditures could be shown to cause corruption." (emphasis added)).
75 Cf. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 2 (2004) (arguing that "Supreme Court Justices use oral
arguments as an information-gathering tool to help them make substantive legal and policy
decisions as close as possible to their preferred outcomes").
76 See supra Parts II-III.
7 See 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (allowing taxpayers to sue when they allege that
government expenditures violate the Establishment Clause).
78 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
7 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
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A. HEIN

In Hein, a five-Justice majority held that a plaintiff suing as a
taxpayer lacked standing to challenge Executive Branch actions
that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause.80 In so doing,
Hein refused to apply Flast's Establishment Clause exception to
the rule against taxpayer standing. 8 ' However, the Court split
sharply in its reasoning. Writing the lead opinion for a plurality of
himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito
He merely
agreed that the plaintiff lacked standing. 82
Alito
Justice
it.83
overrule
not
he
did
however;
Flast,
distinguished
concluded that Flast controlled only when the plaintiff challenged
a direct congressional appropriation of money for the activity
alleged to constitute a religious establishment, as opposed to the
general congressional appropriation for Executive Branch
activities challenged in Hein.8
As with the Chief Justice's reading of McConnell in WRTL 11,85
Justice Alito's constitutional analysis in Hein attracted fire from
both sides. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with
the plurality's conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing.86 He
also agreed, however, with the four dissenters that Flast controlled
the plaintiffs' standing claim.87 Unlike the dissenters, though, he
would have overruled Flast.88 Writing for the four dissenters,
Justice Souter would have reaffirmed Mast and applied it to the
Hein plaintiffs' claim. 89 But both he and Justice Scalia agreed in
their critique of Justice Alito's attempt to distinguish Flast.
8 551 U.S. at 593 (plurality opinion); id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
81Id. at 593 (plurality opinion).
82 Id. at 592-93.
83 Id. at 603-05.
84 See id. (noting that the Hein expenditures "resulted from executive discretion, not
congressional action).
8 See supra Part III.
8 551 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
87 Id. at 628-31 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 643 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the dissenters "see no basis for [distinguishing Flast] in either logic
or precedent').
88 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Flast should be overruled."). Cf. id.
at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).

89 Id.
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What Hein adds to this Essay's discussion of precedent and
multi-judge court dynamics is the importance of an individual
Justice's views-in this case, the views of Justice Kennedy. In
Hein, Kennedy performed his well-known role as the swing Justice
by joining Justice Alito's plurality opinion 90 but also writing
separately.9 ' In a crucial departure from Justice Alito's analysis,
Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that he agreed with Flast.9 2
Thus, five Justices in Hein-Justice Kennedy and the four
dissenters 93-explicitly reaffirmed the precedent case.
Justice Kennedy's actions in Hein remind us that as much as
the results/rationale distinction allows for the incremental
undermining of precedent, creativity has its limits. In Hein,
Justice Alito did everything right if his goal was to perform the
same maneuver that Chief Justice Roberts performed in Rothgery
and WRTL II.9 He wrote what seems to be a moderate, cautious
opinion, and refused the temptation to join Justice Scalia in calling
for Flast's overruling. He used the language of restraint; indeed,
he even went further than Chief Justice Roberts did in Rothgery95
to avoid criticizing the opinion he was declining to overrule.96
Notably, he discussed the separation of powers facet of the issue
that Justice Kennedy focused on in his concurrence.97 Indeed,
Justice Alito's placement of this argument toward the end of his
own case in chief 98 and its arguably odd fit in the flow of his
analysis suggest that the argument might have been inserted to
address Justice Kennedy's concerns.

Id. at 593 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 616 ("In my view the result reached in Flast is correct and should not be called
into question.").
93 Id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
94 See supra Parts II-Ill.
95 See supraPart II.
96 551 U.S. at 614 (plurality opinion) ("Over the years, Flast has been defended by some and
criticized by others. But the present case does not require us to reconsider that precedent").
9
See id. at 611-12 (noting "serious separation-of-powers concerns"); id. at 615-18
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
98 By "case-in-chief," I simply mean Justice Alito's own analysis, which he offered before
considering (and rejecting) the lower courts' and the plaintiffs' arguments in favor of
applying Flast.
9o
91
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Nevertheless, none of this was enough to convince Justice
Kennedy to remain agnostic as to Fast. Instead, Justice Kennedy
explicitly agreed with the four dissenters in reaffirming Mast's
correctness, and thereby frustrated most of the work Justice Alito's
opinion might have accomplished in gradually undermining it as
precedent. 99 This fact suggests that artful writing and concealed
self-destruct buttons, even when combined with professions of
caution and respect for precedent, cannot stop a Justice from simply
stating his own view of the law as Justice Kennedy did when he
reaffirmed Fast. When that Justice is the fifth vote for reaffirming
a precedent, no amount of artfulness can overcome the brute force of
what Justice Brennan called "the rule of five." 00
The fundamental independence of each Justice therefore stands
as a limit on any Justice's-even a clever Chief Justice'sattempts to subtly push law where four of his colleagues do not
want it to go. Thus, a Justice's ability to undermine precedent
turns only partly on creative drafting; in addition, it turns on the
preferences of the other Justices, and in most high-profile cases, on
Justice Kennedy in particular.
B. WINN

If more proof was needed of the last statement, the Court
provided it in 2011 in yet another case cutting back on Flast. In
Winn, the Court held that a plaintiff taxpayer lacked standing
under Mast to challenge Arizona's provision of tax credits for
contributions to organizations that provided scholarships to
religious schools.' 0 ' While Winn essentially featured the same
99 Id. at 616; id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting). To the extent the very result in Hein
comes to be seen as inconsistent with Flast, Hein may still end up undermining Flast. But
Justice Kennedy's explicit approval of Flast presumably will slow that process down.
100 Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 763
(1995); see also Friedman, supra note 11, at 32-33 ('The 'committee' explanation [i.e., the
fact that the Court is a multi-judge body] does not justify stealth overruling . .. because in
each case it is possible to separate the Court majority into the actions of individual Justices.
Each Justice has a choice: either vote to overrule explicitly or not. In any given case, the
question is whether an individual Justice's decision to overrule by stealth was
appropriate.").
101 Az. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011).
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voting lineup as Hein,102 the majority was not as fractured. In
Winn, all the Justices voting to deny standing joined the majority
opinion written by Justice Kennedy. 03
Justice Kennedy distinguished, for standing purposes, between
the Arizona tax credit and the direct government appropriation
that Flast allowed a taxpayer to challenge.104 According to him,
the difference between a tax credit and a direct appropriation
mattered for standing purposes because the underlying
Establishment Clause principle vindicated by "Flast standing"
centered on government exactions from citizens to fund religion,
which is absent in a tax credit provision. 05 Justice Kennedy
signaled early on his intent to distinguish Mast. Immediately
after citing that case, he hastened to "note[] at the outset" that
"Flast'sholding provides a 'narrow exception' to 'the general rule
against taxpayer standing.' "106
For the purposes of this Essay, the important part of Justice
Kennedy's analysis is his treatment of precedent. Writing for the
four dissenters, Justice Kagan argued that the majority's analysis
effectively overruled five Supreme Court cases in which the Court
had proceeded to the merits of a taxpayer's Establishment Clause
suit.10 7 In response to Justice Kennedy's argument that the Court
should not be bound by resolutions of issues (such as standing)
that it did not explicitly address, 08 Justice Kagan argued that
those five opinions should not be understood as having left the
standing issue undecided. 09 She pointed out that the Court
subsequently cited some of those cases as authority for standing

102 Id. at 1439.
In Winn, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan had replaced, respectively,
Justices Souter and Stevens but voted in the same way as their predecessors. Id.
103 Id.
1" Id. at 1447.

10

Id.

Id. at 1445 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1453-54 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court did not question the
litigants' standing in any of these five prior cases "filed by taxpayers alleging that tax
expenditures unlawfully subsidized religion").
10
107

10 Id. at 1448-49.
10 Id. at 1454-55

("Mhe decisions on their face reflect the Court's recognition of what
gave the plaintiffs standing. . . .).
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doctrine.o10 Justice Kagan also questioned the credibility of any
claim that the Court was unaware of the standing issues in those
cases, noting that amici in each of those five cases (including the
U.S. Government) had suggested a lack of standing"' and further
pointing out that the Court decided three of those cases within a
year of deciding another important taxpayer standing case.112 She
also reversed the majority's presumption about the force of an
implicit jurisdictional decision, arguing that "the Court should not
'disregard the implications of an exercise of judicial authority
assumed to be proper for over 40 years.' "113
Regardless of the ultimate merits of Justice Kagan's allegation
that the majority misused precedent, one can still question the
breeziness with which Justice Kennedy pushed past those cases. If
nothing else, reasoned decision making would seem to demand a
more thoughtful and specific response to Justice Kagan's criticisms.
Justice Kennedy's treatment of precedent in Winn reveals the flip
side of the lesson gleaned from Hein: Just as the rule of five may
frustrate careful-and possibly calculated-attempts to undermine
precedent if the author cannot obtain the fifth vote,114 the same rule
gives license to a Justice to run roughshod over that precedent if the
Justice is confident of obtaining the fifth vote-or if, as in Winn, the
author is the fifth vote."15
VI. STARE DECISIS AND DOCTRINAL COHERENCE

Of the cases discussed above, Citizens United features the
deepest discussions of stare decisis. A potentially revealing feature
about that case is that both Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and
Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence centered their discussions of
stare decisis on the importance of large-scale doctrinal coherence.
Justice Kennedy wove a doctrinal tapestry comprised largely of
110See id. at 1455.
nI Id. at 1454 & n.5.

Id. at 1454.
at 1455 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307 (1962)).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
115 Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined in full by four other members of the Court.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1439.
112

113 Id.
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dissenting opinions116 and made some heroic assumptions in
characterizing prohibitions on identity-based speech restrictions as
a well-established First Amendment rule.11 7 He also worked hard
to force empirical reality to conform to his constitutional vision,
asserting, without support, that unlimited corporate expenditures
would not cause the electorate to lose faith in democracy.118
As scholars have observed, the coherence Justice Kennedy
labored so hard to create is a fragile one."19 Does free speech
protection extend to expenditures by foreigners? It is hard to see
why not. Under Justice Kennedy's view, more speech simply
makes for a more informed electorate and disclosure rules allow
citizens to discount speech if they distrust the source.120 Does free
speech protection extend to expenditures made on behalf of
judicial candidates? Apparently it does, even though the Courtled by Justice Kennedy himself-held the previous year that the
resulting perception of bias was so great that due process required
a judge to recuse himself from a case involving a large
supporter.121 These issues will have to be resolved in the future.
For now, the important point is that Justice Kennedy's opinion

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900-01 (2010).
Id. at 902-03. Most notably, Justice Kennedy stated that the parties and Court in
Buckley, in the midst of an otherwise comprehensive discussion of federal campaign finance
law, somehow overlooked a major provision of that legislation. Id. at 902 (discussing
Buckley's failure to address 18 U.S.C. § 610).
118 Id. at 909-10. Apparently Justice Kennedy did not fully believe this a year before
when he wrote a majority opinion holding that a supporter's independent expenditures on
behalf of an elected state court judge could so taint the perception of the judge's fairness in
a case involving the supporter that due process required the judge to recuse himself. See
generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
119 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 581, 585 (2011) (positing that the analysis in Citizens United is "likely to lead to new
incoherence").
120 See id. at 608 ("The majority's logic [in Citizens United as] applied to [campaign
expenditures by foreigners] is that we should not be afraid of more speech and that we
should trust that full disclosure will allow the American people to decide whether to support
candidates who may be supported by foreign interests.").
121 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265. It is worth noting that much of the financial support the
judge received in Caperton took the form of independent expenditures, which the Citizens
United Court held did not create perceptions of favoritism that undermined democracy. See
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 967-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116
117
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attempted to weave together majorities, dissents, and debatable
empirical observations to create a simple, coherent doctrine.122
Chief Justice Roberts's discussion of stare decisis in his
concurring opinion similarly aspired to this higher-level doctrinal
coherence. The substance of his discussion leads off with the
following statement: "if the precedent under consideration itself
departed from the Court's jurisprudence, returning to the
'"intrinsically sounder" doctrine established in prior cases' may
'better serv[e] the values of stare decisis.' "123 It is striking that his
opinion's first substantive argument about stare decisis claims
that some higher level of doctrinal coherence justifies overruling
precedent.
This statement is admittedly a slim read. Still, it suggests that
Chief Justice Roberts places significant value in the type of highlevel doctrinal coherence Justice Kennedy attempted to construct
in his majority opinion. The confluence between these two
Justices on this point is striking. Justice Kennedy is sometimes
accused of being the biggest judicial imperialist on the Court. 124
He wrote the opinions-and, indeed, created the majorities-in
Alden v. Maine,125 Lawrence v. Texas, 126 and Boumediene v.
Bushl 27-all aggressive opinions that have been criticized as
instances of severe judicial overreaching. 128
His roughshod
122 So understood, Justice Kennedy's Citizens United opinion stands in stark contrast not
just to Justice Stevens's dissent, but also to Chief Justice Roberts's much more nuanced
application of the First Amendment later that same term in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010). For a discussion comparing these cases, see William
D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First Amendment
Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STET. L. REV. 821 (2011).
123 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted).
124 See, e.g., Douglas Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Vote and His Critics, 11 GREEN
BAG 317, 331 (2008) (describing a critic's view of Justice Kennedy).
125 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
126 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
It should be noted that six Justices agreed on the result in
Lawrence. Justice O'Connor would have ruled on an equal protection ground, however, thus
rendering Justice Kennedy the key fifth vote for the Court's due-process-based rationale.
Id. at 579.
127 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
128 See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and
Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1555 (2004) (criticizing Lawrence on these grounds); John E.
Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Construction Supreme Court, 75
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treatment of pre-Buckley precedent and breezy rejection of the
Caperton appearance of corruption concern in Citizens United fit
within that pattern of supremely confident adjudication. Chief
Justice Roberts, meanwhile, pledges humility and respect for
precedent. 129 It is noteworthy therefore that in a high-stakes case
like Citizens United Chief Justice Roberts justified his vote to
overrule precedent in part on the same basic concern as that
expressed by Justice Kennedy.
Of course, a Justice can be humble and respect stare decisis
Certainly, nobody
while still voting to overrule precedent.
suggests that stare decisis should pose an absolute bar to
reconsidering precedent. As one continues to watch Chief Justice
Roberts, however, it will be interesting to see the degree to which
he expresses a preference for doctrinal coherence over doctrinal
stability. More to the particular point of this Essay, it will be
interesting to track the relationship between that preference and
his proven intuition to move incrementally but tactically, with an
eye toward using his colleagues' more forthright tendencies to his
advantage. In Rothgery, for instance, his preference for large-scale
coherence based on an originalist approach to the issue may have
given way to his incrementalist intuitions, especially in light of the
fact that there appeared to be no reasonable chance of Justice
Thomas's more radical approach prevailing. 30 In WRTL II any
preference he had for large-scale coherence based on a strong
reading of the First Amendment arguably worked in tandem with
Justice Scalia's forthright call for overruling McConnell.131 By
resisting that call, Chief Justice Roberts may have preserved his
legitimacy as a judge committed to precedent while still setting the
stage for McConnell's ultimate demise.132 In Citizens United,
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2000) ("Ultimately, Justice Kennedy's opinion [in Alden v.
Maine] is based on nothing but the Gang of Five's view of how the federal system should
work."); John Yoo, The Supreme Court Goes to War, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at A23
(criticizing the Boumediene Court's infusion into the nation's war making as
"micromanagement").
129 See supra notes 2-3.
130 See supra Part II.
131 See supra Part III.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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which squarely raised the question about whether to reaffirm
McConnell,"3 the Chief Justice allowed his large-scale aspirations
to surface.
These readings of the Chief Justice's actions are necessarily
speculative, but they provide focal points for scholars' continued
evaluation of his approach both to precedent and to his colleagues.
During the course of what is likely to be a long tenure as Chief
Justice, he surely will have many opportunities to use one to affect
the other.
VII. CONCLUSION

The cases discussed in this Essay suggest a few preliminary
conclusions about how a Justice intent on stealth overruling can
make use of the Court's multi-judge character. First, as scholars
have noted, oral argument provides at least some opportunity for a
Justice to make arguments-including those related to
precedent-that other Justices can pick up on in their opinions.1 34
Chief Justice Roberts's questioning of the Solicitor General in the
Citizens United reargument created opportunities for Justice
Kennedy to deny the role that precedent otherwise might have
played."a5 Skillful questioning of the sort performed by the Chief
Justice regarding the meaning of the key footnote in Bellotti,
combined with his declaration that the matter was closed, 36 surely
provided an additional rhetorical tool available to Justice Kennedy
when he set about to explain why Bellotti did not implicitly
authorize restrictions on corporate speech in electoral
campaigns. 3 7
Second, the existence of more aggressive-or perhaps simply
more forthright--colleagues opens up a space for a Justice to
133 But see supra note 61 (noting that narrower grounds were available for the Court to
decide the issue in favor of the speaker).
134 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The
Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1898-99 (2001) ("[This initial
dialogue might have .. . an effect on the final opinion[ ].").
135 See supra Part IV.
136 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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undermine a precedent while publicly resisting those colleagues'
calls for its explicit overruling. 38 Third, a Justice seeking to
undermine precedent may do so by reaffirming the precedent but
also inserting a self-destruct button that would pave the way for a
future Court to conclude that the precedent cannot be squared
Any surreptitious
with basic constitutional requirements. 3 9
undermining a Justice may wish to perform via this or the other
methods, however, remains subject to the fifth Justice's power to
40
thwart these attacks by explicitly reaffirming the precedent.1
These tentative conclusions raise some interesting follow-on
insights as well as questions that need further investigation. For
example, consider the second of these conclusions, which focuses
on a Justice's ability to leverage colleagues' more forthright calls
for overruling by adopting a seemingly moderate stance that
Is it
nevertheless undermines the precedent in question.
appropriate for a Justice to state in an opinion that a precedent
likely is wrong but still to adhere to it anyway because of stare
decisis? Or does stare decisis carry with it an implicit gag rule, at
least on bald statements that the precedent is wrong? This
question requires a deeper investigation about the audiences for
Court opinions,141 the effects of such statements, and the public's
requirements of opinions in terms of frankness and adherence to
precedent the Justice honestly believes is wrong.142
With regard to the third conclusion, is it appropriate for
Justices to preserve a precedent-even one they do not like-by
interpreting it to require a test that would likely fail to pass
constitutional muster? In other words, are self-destruct buttons
cynical ploys to let a precedent die a somewhat slower, agonized,
See supra Part I (discussing Rothgery); supra Part II (discussing WRTL 11).
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A (discussing Hein).
141 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11, at 41-62 (discussing the concept of "acoustic
separation"-i.e., the idea that opinions may be heard and understood in different ways by
different audiences-and the possibility that stealth overruling is a species of the Court's
attempt to send different messages to different audiences).
142 One of the factors that surely would be relevant here is whether the precedent relates
to a constitutional or statutory question. Conventional wisdom holds that statutory stare
decisis should be firmer given Congress's ability to reverse a statutory interpretation with
which it disagrees by amending the underlying statute.
138

139
140
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but still inevitable death, or are they legitimate attempts to honor
stare decisis as much as possible? This question probably cannot
be answered in the abstract; rather, it requires assumptions about
at least the Justice's good faith in preserving the shell of the
precedent and the likelihood that this preservative analysis could
in fact survive over the long term.
Finally, questions about the power of the fifth Justice in any
would-be majority bring us back full circle to the individual
Justice's conduct with regard to stealth overruling. The example
illustrating this last point-Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Hein14 3-throws this uncertainty into sharp relief. While Justice
Kennedy played a key role-indeed, the key role-in preserving
Flast, his opinion nevertheless undermined Flast, at least
partially, by embracing a distinction that is hard to take
seriously.144 The ultimate result-a reaffirmed precedent now
limited in an arguably unprincipled way-is in many ways the
worst of all possible worlds for a Court committed to principled
explanation of its results.145
Understanding this dynamic simply returns us to questions
about the appropriateness of such arguably unprincipled judicial
action. But viewing it in the context of Hein-in which one Justice
single-handedly was responsible for creating this state of affairsreveals how important a single Justice's view can be when the
Court considers its predecessors' handiwork.
In sum, then, individual Justices' conduct regarding precedent
does matter. In particular, on a multi-judge court like the
Supreme Court, it matters in the context of their colleagues'
approach to the particular precedential issues before them.
Therefore, it matters how individual Justices go about navigating
not just their own attitudes about stare decisis but also how they
us See supra Part V.A.
144 See supra Part V.A.
145 In this sense it is ironic that the Justice who single-handedly created this situation in
Hein-Justice Kennedy-is the one who has perhaps waxed most rhapsodic about the
importance of the judicial role. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2001) (striking down a statute limiting the ability of federally funded legal aid lawyers to
raise certain legal arguments in litigation on the ground that it interfered with courts'
ability to perform their core function).
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instantiate those views on the playground inhabited by eight other
Justices. Uncovering those approaches therefore becomes an
important part of understanding how the Court ultimately views
its audience(s), its conception of law, and its role in announcing
and guiding that law. For the same reasons, critiquing those
approaches constitutes an important part of scholars' overall
evaluation of the Court's work.

